## Homework 13, due October 20

- (1) (Page 194, problem 19) Let n = pq be a product of two distinct primes.
  - (a) Let m be a multiple of  $\phi(n)$ . Show that if gcd(a, n) = 1, then  $a^m \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  and  $\pmod{q}$ .
  - (b) For the same m, let a be an arbitrary integer (mod n), so that possibly  $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ . Show that  $a^{m+1} \equiv a \pmod{p}$  and  $\pmod{q}$ .
  - (c) Let e and d be encryption and decryption exponents for RSA with modulus n. Show that  $a^{ed} \equiv a \pmod{n}$  for all a. This shows that we do not need to assume gcd(a, n) = 1 for RSA to work.
  - (d) If p and q are large, why is it likely that gcd(a, n) = 1 for a randomly chosen a?
- (2) (a) Does 48382 have a square root modulo 83987? Explain.
- (b) Let  $n = 213523 \cdot 304687$ . Find x and y with  $x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$  but  $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{n}$ . (3) Suppose you know that

 $271610257949550853120^2 \equiv 689562347736325759112749577741079678616245489330498^2$ 

 $(\mod 6465410235775891941079948367093647049851252987191349).$ 

Use this information to factor 6465410235775891941079948367093647049851252987191349.

- (4) (Page 108, problem 27) Alice designs a cryptosystem (following Rabin) as follows. She chooses two distinct primes p and q congruent to 3 (mod 4) and keeps them secret. She makes n = pq public. When Bob wants to send Alice a message m, he computes  $x = m^2$  (mod n) and sends x to Alice. She makes a decryption machine that does the following: When the machine is given a number x, it computes the square roots of  $x \pmod{n}$  since it knows p and q. There is usually more than one square root. It chooses one at random and gives it to Alice. When Alice receives x from Bob, she puts it into her machine. If the output from the machine is a meaningful message, she assumes it is the correct message. If it is not meaningful, she puts x into the machine again. She continues until she gets a meaningful message.
  - (a) Why should Alice expect to get a meaningful message fairly soon?
  - (b) If Eve intercepts x (she already knows n), why should it be hard for her to determine m?
  - (c) If Eve breaks into Alice's office and can try a few chosen ciphertext attacks on Alice's decryption machine, how can she determine the factorization of n?